For 1954, the fund was increased to 5 million dollars. Of this the Finns received 480,000 dollars, SKP 55,000 dollars, NKP 30,000 dollars and DKP 25,000 dollars [35]. A sum of 1.374 million dollars was not distributed. This was put into the 1955 total, which thereby became 6,424 million dollars. In addition to that, CPSU contributed 1.7 million dollars from its own coffers. PCI got 2.64 million and PCF got 1.2 million, while the Finns got 450,000, NKP and SKP got 30,000 each, and DKP got 25,000 dollars. There were payments to 28 recipients in all, mostly to communist parties [36].
At the CPSU's Twentieth Congress in February 1956, leaders of the parties participating in the fund were to be informed that for that year it would total 5.5 million dollars, the CPSU contributing 3 million, with a further 179,000 dollars remaining from the previous years. The top-scorers were the usual ones, though one notes that the Austrian party received 200,000 dollars from the fund plus 200,000 direct from CPSU. The Finns got half a million, SKP 70,000 dollars, DKP 25,000 and Iceland's socialist unity party 20,000 dollars. That was not the only help DKP received in 1956. In May, the CPSU decided to give Land og Folk two new composing machines worth 60,000 rubles and the foreign trade ministry was instructed to formulate a document to make it seem that DKP was buying the machines [37]. Such material assistance was not a burden on the Soviet Union's foreign currency earnings in the same way as contributions in dollars.
In 1957, the fund reached 5.5 million dollars. The PCI received all of 2.635 million dollars, topped up by an extra grant of 500,000 dollars directly from CPSU. The Finns again got half a million, NKP 45,000, SKP 40,000 and DKP 65,000 dollars [38].
While the details we have for later years are limited for individual parties like the DKP, through Loupan and Lorrain we can trace the development of the total sum as follows: 1958, 6.8 million dollars; 1959, 9 million; 1960, 9.05 million; 1961, 10.5 million; 1962, 11.05 million; 1963, 14.65 million; 1964, 15.75 million dollars [39].
The Chinese stopped paying in to the fund in 1962. In 1966, following Brezhnev's take-over, the fund was renamed The International Fund for Help to Left and Working Class Organisations. Apart from the Chinese, the same contributors were involved.
Loupain and Lorrain publish the document showing the support for 1969. That year's total was 16.5 million dollars, the CPSU paying 14 million, the Czechs, Rumanians, Poles and Hungarians 500,000 each, the Bulgarians 350,000 and the East Germans 200,000. The SED's modest contribution was probably the result of its contributions that year to setting up the new West German CP. Top of the list that year was PCI with 3.7 million dollars, while the PCF received 2 million and the American party 1 million. There are 34 recipients on the list, among whom one notes Lelio Basso and his PSIUP, which received 700,000 dollars. Basso's party became worthy of support following Pietro Nenni's party entering a Christian Democrat led government in 1963.
In 1969, the Danish party got 100,000 dollars, roughly equivalent to the 65,000 it had received in 1957 [40]. The allocation over the 12 years may have fluctuated but presumably there was a constant increase in dollars corresponding to a quite constant sum in real terms. Those 12 years were difficult ones for DKP, struggling to keep its paper going. In this period, C.H. Hermansson, upon taking over leadership of the Swedish party in 1964, demonstrated his independence by not taking subsidies. The Norwegian party meanwhile continued its slow but sure decline towards oblivion. All this made DKP a much more interesting prospect, known as it was for its loyalty.
Other subsidies to the DKP are documented in the CPSU CC archive in the special file of decisions: on 15 May 1958, 20,000 rubles changed at the then rate of 4 rubles to the dollar; and one 24 February 1959, 10,000 rubles changed into crowns. On 13 July 1959, CPSU telegraphed support to the extent of 50,000 crowns for the publication of the CPSU's history in Danish, with a similar sum granted on 6 February 1960. At the same time, it was decided to organise 5-6 week courses for leading Danish comrades in the theory of Marxism-Leninism. This would become a further source of income for DKP. The courses were free to DKP but the party charged the members participating fees in crowns. These fees went directly into party coffers. Incidentally, the proposal for the courses came from DKP. On 28 September 1960, DKP received 12 documentary films from CPSU worth 100,000 rubles. And on 17 December 1960, following a request from DKP's CC, 16,750 rubles were granted for exchanging [41]. When I visited the CPSU's CC archive in 1993, the file of decisions was still accessible. But if one looks at the survey in Danica i Rusland, based on unhindered access to the whole files, one can see requests from DKP's CC by the score, and before copies of that material comes to Denmark, we are unable to say anything certain about the extent of the supplementary granting of subsidies [42].
Support 1970-1990
The Rumanians withdrew from the fund following a number of squabbles in 1974. That year 18.4 million dollars were shared out. In 1977, the fund was up to 18.7 million dollars. In 1981, 15.295 million dollars was shared out. That year the US party topped the list with 2 million dollars subsidy, PCF got the same, while the Finns got 1.4 million. The Italians were not on the list, and reflecting internal developments between Moscow and the communist parties. Thus, the Swedish Workers Communist Party appears on the list with a subsidy of 100,000 dollars. That is not the 'old' communist party VPK, but the new old-style party. The Norwegian party got 50,000 dollars, while DKP had become No 11 on the list with a subsidy of 350,000 dollars [43].
The international fund reached 20.35 million dollars in 1985, but in real terms it declined in value during the 1980s. Under Gorbachev the subsidies further declined and totally vanished with the dissolution of the Soviet Union following the coup in 1991. By this time, according to Loupan and Lorrain, the total direct subsidy to the PCF alone from 1950-1990 was c. 50 million dollars, along with other forms of subsidy such as free newsprint for L'Humanité and Drapeau rouge. Between 1982 and 1989 this amounted to 4,058 tons of free paper [44].
Other forms of support
The DKP too benefited from many indirect sources of support such as the printing press, composing machines and courses mentioned above. In 1969, Land og Folk again received a printing press form the GDR. Large subsidies were also attained through the party's publishing house. That started already in the 1930s with Mondes Forlag, which published the stenographical reports from two of the Moscow Trials, paid for completely by the Russians. The Mega, Sputnik and Tiden publishing houses, all received large subsidies towards publishing Russian books in Denmark. The subsidies could be in the form of direct payment for production in Denmark, in free translations from Russian, or by the publisher receiving books wholly produced in the Soviet Union and given cheaply for sale in Denmark. In such a business practice subsidies could be built in by a variety of means. If one could convince the Russians that it was wholly unrealistic to think of being able to publish Lenin's Selected Works in Danish, the printing subsidy could be raised to a level at which it produced a masked subsidy to the party. But the translation could also be inflated.
In 1961, the party began publication of the journal Verden Rundt, which from 1963 appeared as a supplement to the journal Tiden. It contained articles from the world communist movement. The subsidy for the printing of Verden Rundt surely helped cover the costs of Tiden. There are several statements to the effect that Ib Nølund just took the money to finance Tiden with him home from Prague. Similarly, one should note that the Russians subscribed to a large quantity of Land og Folk, which were flown to Moscow every day. One should also add to these indirect subsidies the many holidays that leading Danish communists took in the Soviet Union or other Eastern-Bloc countries; also the lecture-tours they undertook while there, for which they were very well paid. One should also remember the friendship societies, for there is no doubt that they were wholly paid by the Russians [45].
DKP — a party on benefit
A related question is: how such large means were channelled into an organisation like DKP, why so few knew about it and how it affected the organisation. Among those I have spoken to there seems to be agreement that DKP's print works Terpo Tryk was a key channel for the supplying of the Russian money. The print shop simply received large print orders from the Russians which they carried out at inflated prices. The work was done much better that in the Soviet Union, but the price was many times greater than one could have expected to pay in Milan or Lisbon. Inflating the invoices was in that sense a conscious subsidy to DKP. Sometimes the payment never turned up and the party's president, Jespersen, Jensen or Sohn, had to travel to Moscow to rescue the party from bankruptcy. Whether Terpo was the conduit for the sums we can find on the list of payments is not known at present. Possibly, one can speak of subsidies both via inflating invoices and direct cash subsidies. The KGB chief in Copenhagen in the1960s-70s, M.P. Lubimov has said in newspaper interviews that he paid cash sums to Knud Jespersen. And the previously mentioned anonymous source, who worked in the CPSU's foreign department with regard to Scandinavia during the 1960s, has confirmed that the KGB was used for transporting the money.
Stories of Moscow Gold have represented a permanent component of DKP's press history. That they could be rejected as mere stories is closely linked to the fact that only a very few knew anything of what really happened and how it happened. The few who knew have had no interest in telling because they were themselves implicated. Just as Aksel Larsen never told about Arne Munch-Petersen, neither did he tell about the money, because it would taint him too. Detailed accounts were never presented to the CC. The details of the accounts were known only to a tiny circle consisting of the treasurer, business-manager, president and accountant. Once the accounts had been audited the main figures were presented to the party leadership.
What effects did the money have on DKP? It is naturally difficult to establish, but certainly one can say that apart from easing the party's economic situation, the money also created problems. The money gave the party a false sense of its possible range and a swollen bureaucracy. In the 1970s there were almost 100 employees in the DKP enterprise, and although the two print shops required a number of typographers and lithographers, there were proortionately many employees for 10,000 members. A previous party employee believed that this made the employees thoughtless in regard to expenditure. And that resulted, for example, in Terpo Tryk not being a competitive printing firm.
One can ask oneself the question, whether there would have been a communist party in Denmark without the Russian subsidies. Of course, one cannot give a serious reply. But it is certain that if there had existed a self-sustained communist party in Denmark it would have had a much more moderate dimension and would have had to live with a much more limited staff. Land og Folk would hardly have survived 1958.
One can also ask oneself the question: why did the Russians pay such astronomical sums to keep a communist movement going? There is hardly any doubt about the answer in the early period. Lenin relied on the Comintern to break the isolation the Russian Revolution was undergoing once the German revolution was stillborn. When this situation changed is hard to say. Did Stalin himself believe that he was on route to communism and that the Comintern was a tool for undertaking the world revolution? It is difficult to give an unambiguous answer. At any rate, he put his own survival and that of the system above everything else. It is obvious that the Soviet leadership at some stage must have asked itself whether it had any purpose to sustain life in a communist movement unable to function on the same scale without subsidies. And seen in that perspective, that the communist movement was a type of supplement to the foreign service, a type of voluntary corps for public relations services for the Soviet Union, the expenditure is in a proportion that is understandable. But the question is rather whether it makes complete sense only in understanding the relationship in terms of aims. After all, ideological struggle is connected with both illusions and also lies in the case of all large nations. It is particularly valid for the US ideological offensive over democracy. I think that one must count on at least a part of the answer being found in the Byzantine character of Soviet public life. The communist ideology ('Marxism-Leninism') was the only form of thought allowed. It did not necessarily mean that a consensus existed around it, but the terror made sure that other forms of thought were always subject to suppression. It probably also created in a part of the old, now in reality outdated thinking, a certain inertia perhaps also linked to a certain nostalgia. Such as the Americans have regarding their revolution and the civil war.
Morten Thing, Centre for the Study of Working-Class Culture, Copenhagen
Translation courtesy Mike Jones