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Glasnost
New Labour Style
Historians of British communism have every reason to be interested in the contents of the files of the Security Service (popularly known as MI5). Throughout the CPGB's existence, it was regarded by MI5 as the dangerous agent of a hostile foreign power, liable to commit acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion against the interests of the imperial British state. Any and every activity of British communists, including perfectly lawful and peaceful trade-union and political activity, was fair game for the snoopers, to whom all facets of communism were by definition part of an imagined Russian grand design for world domination. As well as compiling detailed records on the Party and its members (using information gleaned from bugging, infiltration, interception of communications and the monitoring of public political activity), it seems that MI5 may also have acquired a substantial quantity of the CP's own files as a result of burglaries and police raids. Other far-left groups, such as the Trotskyists, were also targeted because of their 'subversive' politics. The extent to which the spooks went beyond mere snooping and used disruptive tactics (such as the employment of agents provocateurs) against the far left remains an open question.
For nearly nine decades no MI5 records of any description were allowed into the public domain. Then, in November 1997, after years of rumours that this policy was to change, MI5 files from the first ten years of the organisation's existence (1909–19) were released into the Public Record Office at Kew. These consisted of edited versions of anodyne official in-house histories (Class KV1) and the two surviving Subject Files from this period (Class KV3). The release of the records was a carefully stage-managed media event and can be seen as part of the 'charm offensive' which MI5 has been mounting since the end of the Cold War, as it attempts to justify its continued existence and considerable budget.
At the same time, there was much controversy about the fate of more recent MI5 records, following the revelation by the MI5 whistle-blower David Shayler that the organisation had counter-subversion files on Harriet Harman, Peter Mandelson (a former YCL member) and Jack Straw.
In January 1998 Straw outlined in the House of Commons the basis used by MI5 in selecting files for preservation; it turned out that the Service was concerned to retain records of significant events and individuals, and of changes in policy, as well as 'period pieces' illustrative of its work. Then, in July 1998, Straw revealed to the Commons that MI5 had created a total of 725,000 files since its establishment in 1909; of these, some 285,000 had been destroyed (110,000 since the end of the Cold War). Of the files still extant, 40,000 are Subject Files; 290,000 are Personal Files, made up as follows: 40,000 'restricted' files on microfilm; 230,000 'closed' files; and 20,000 'current' files. In October 1998 the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee also stated that MI5 has 290,000 Personal Files, 40,000 held on microfiche. The Committee categorised the 250,000 hard-copy Personal Files as follows: 17,500 'Green' (active inquiries may be made); 97,000 'Amber' (inquiries prohibited but relevant information may be added); and 135,500 'Red' (inquiries prohibited; information may not be added; access for research purposes only). In addition, there were said to be 3,000 temporary 'Green' files. How these figures relate to those given by Straw is an interesting question. It would seem that the 40,000 files in microform (either film or fiche) are outside the 'traffic light' classification; that the figure of 20,000 'current' files given by Straw is made up of both permanent and temporary 'Green' files (17,500 + 3,000 = 20,500); and that Straw's figure of 230,000 'closed' files includes both 'Amber' and 'Red' files (97,000 + 135,500 = 232,500).
In July 1998 it was also announced that MI5 was no longer actively pursuing any counter-subversion investigations; and in October the Intelligence and Security Committee revealed that MI5 was only destroying counter-subversion files on individuals aged 55 or over.
In January 1999 a second batch of MI5 files was released into the PRO. This was made up of Personal Files from the First and Second World Wars relating almost exclusively to espionage cases (Class KV2) and further expurgated versions of in-house histories (Class KV4). The most important document in KV4 is the Curry Report, a review of MI5's entire history from 1909 to 1945, which contains substantial sections on the CPGB. (The PRO plans to publish the Report in book-form, with an introduction by Professor Christopher Andrew, in June 1999.)
In February 1999 surprisingly radical changes to the rules regarding the preservation of MI5 files were announced by Straw following representations from the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, and the Advisory Council on Public Records (the latter of which Straw had asked to conduct a review on the subject). Files relating to less significant or less newsworthy events will be kept; at least 1% of Personal Files relating to individuals who were spied on, but not the subject of 'security action', will be saved; and all substantive Policy and Subject Files, as well as means of reference, will be preserved. In addition, files earmarked for destruction will be reviewed by officials from the PRO. This undeniably represents a significant, and very welcome, retreat from previous government policy; yet there remains much for historians to be dissatisfied about.
Straw has remained adamant that the new Freedom of Information law (if it ever appears) will not cover security and intelligence records.
Those pre-1945 MI5 files which have so far been released consist only of bowdlerised in-house histories (in which counter-subversion is either ignored or glossed over) and a narrow, and self-serving, selection of operational files (none of which relates to counter-subversion). Historians are being expected to accept at face value MI5's own 'party line' account of itself; but to get to the bottom of MI5's (and its targets') history, we need much broader access to operational files, which are still largely being either destroyed or retained by MI5.
There is also the question of how long it takes for files to migrate down the Thames to Kew. We are promised one further release of pre-1945 files (from the inter-war period) in due course, but that will be the last release for the foreseeable future. Straw indicated to the Commons Select Committee on Public Administration in April 1998 that it will be 'some decades' before any post-1945 material sees the light of day.
In July 1998 Straw told the Commons that the following considerations restrict the release of files: 'the need to protect sensitive investigative techniques; to protect information supplied in confidence by agents and liaison services; and to bear in mind the potential impact of release on those individuals concerned and their families'. Yet MI5's modus operandi is well-known. If it is to be argued that MI5 personnel and agents, and / or their descendants, could face distress or endangerment, the onus must be on MI5 i) to establish that this really is the case (are there any descendants?; have they said they would feel distress?; from whom does any purported danger come?); and ii) to show that the problem can only be addressed by completely withholding the files concerned, rather than releasing them in a 'sanitised' condition. As regards the impact of release on the subjects of files, and / or their families, surely the person concerned, or his / her relatives if he / she is dead, could be consulted about whether the file should be released, either in its complete state or 'sanitised' in some way.
There is also the matter of the records of the Police Special Branches (which have played an important counter-subversive role); none of these has ever reached the public domain and no information about them has ever been given.
What looks like limited progress towards openness seems actually to be the result of a curious symbiosis of New Labour and "New Spooks', with the former now converted to the cult of the Free Economy and the Strong State, and the latter to the cult of Public Relations.
More substantial openness is apparent in America, where Freedom of Information provisions do apply to security and intelligence bodies. Historians of American Communism have been able to make significant use of FBI files; and counter-subversion records from as recent a period as the 1960s are in the public domain. In Canada and Australia, too, historical counter-subversion records seem to have been substantially preserved and made available.
We may never achieve such a state of affairs in this country; if we do, it will only be after a good deal more agitating and complaining.
