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A Revealing Document
Willie Thompson writes: Wholly by accident I came across a document entitled 'Draft Report for Party EC of YCL EC Discussion on Twentieth Congress of the CPSU' and a record of the discussion held by the Executive Committee (subsequently it was renamed the National Committee) of the Young Communist League in the wake of the Khrushchev 'Secret Speech' of February 1956 and the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party in March of that year. The discussion, took place on April 30, attended by ten participants, of whom seven were voting members (this document does not record which were which or the full attendance list). If any women were among the ten they are not recorded as having spoken. This copy was among the records of the Scottish Committee of the Communist Party, which are now stored at Glasgow Caledonian University, and presumably it will also be filed in the CP archive in Manchester.
The proceedings were opened by John Moss, the YCL National Secretary, with a rather bland presentation (it is commented that everyone present had been at the closed session of the party congress) outlining the official narrative regarding what was generally then known of the CPSU 20th Congress. A 'new spirit' was exemplified by fact that 'the people's Democracies were putting wrongs right …' He cited the cases of Rajk, Kostov and Gomulka in support. Claiming that 'There was not the same discussion in the YCL as in the Party', Moss nevertheless asserted that his experience of discussions in YCL branches had been 'healthy'.
Monty Johnstone, who was the editor of the YCL monthly Challenge, is then recorded as making a vehement attack on this complacency by submitting a resolution which (the minute feels it necessary to note is 'drafted by himself'), demanding comprehensive changes both in attitude and practice. Johnstone's critique is wide-ranging (the text is attached to the minute). After welcoming aspects of economic and social improvement in the USSR it expresses 'deepest regret at the crimes against innocent people now revealed'. The use of the word 'crimes' is significant, for this terminology was studiously avoided in the official discourse of the CPGB and YCL, 'mistakes' and 'excesses' being the preferred terms — at most, 'grave abuses'.
The resolution goes on to express hopes for investigations into the police methods used in the show trials, sanctions against the persons responsible, serious analysis of how such things could come about, and finally demands self-criticism on the part of British communists for accepting so easily the Stalin cult and all its implications, and that the party should never again attack or defend 'controversial actions' without adequate evidence and 'careful study'.
In speaking to his resolution Johnstone again referred to 'crimes' (this is capitalised in the text), repudiating the customary euphemisms; quoted Lenin to the effect that a party's seriousness is demonstrated by its analysis of its shortcomings — which had not yet been undertaken by the CPGB. He even declared that socialism and liberty were 'inextricably bound up', noting that a discussion of this sort in relation to socialist perspectives would be necessary if Labour supporters were to be won to the CP.
It was not enough to say that Socialism had been built in the Soviet Union and that the evils exposed at the 20th Congress were therefore of a relatively minor character. Socialism was not just economic successes [though]? these were vital in laying the basis for greater developments in human freedom and happiness … Personal despotism, repression, false trials, extorted confessions and executions not of class enemies but of genuine Socialist revolutionaries were a complete violation of Socialism. The Party and Daily Worker should stop talking only of 'mistakes' and 'excesses' and refer to them as the CRIMES they were.
Des Lock was if anything even more forceful, noting how the Cominform had been dissolved without 'a word of self-criticism' and mentioned the Nuremberg Trial principle that carrying out orders was no defence and yet no-one had been punished for the state crimes - all blame being shifted onto Stalin and Beria. Tony Winsloe spoke in a similar vein, arguing that the perpetrators should be brought to boot [sic — presumably a typo]. The USSR was strong enough to absorb justified criticism.
Gerry Cohen however opposed the resolution 'in its present form' while acknowledging that the British party should have known better, for, he argued, self-criticism was now being carried out and the effect of the revelations on the YCL was largely neutral neither very good nor very harmful. Moreover, he argued, the demands on the Executive Committee made in Johnstone's resolution were 'asking for the impossible' and also — a somewhat bureaucratic consideration — that it would be improper for the YCL to make its views known before the Party EC had met — though it should make its views known to the latter body.
The recorded expressions of views which followed, from Stan Levenson, Colin Sweet, John Moss and Bob Leeson all opposed the resolution and all demonstrated the continuing hold of Soviet loyalism and wish to find justification, even from individuals who were later to be on the renovating wing of the CPGB. A variety of revealing pretexts for rejecting the resolution were advanced — it was pious, it 'cut across the principles of international solidarity', 'excesses' and 'mistakes' were indeed a more appropriate formulation than 'crimes', because 'if seen historically rough justice against the bourgeoisie was necessary' — in general, lessons had been learned and things were being now put right. John Moss himself adhered to the orthodox line, laying responsibility on the cult of the individual and asserting that it would be 'irresponsible' to send resolutions to the EC or the Daily Worker. In any case 'This question was not concerned with Youth'. Once put to the vote the resolution was defeated by four votes to three and it was agreed to draw up a document for the party EC outlining the divergent views — which is presumably this document. Monty Johnstone, though he accepted his defeat and submitted to political discipline even after the Hungarian invasion, was not readily forgiven — not until decades had passed was he permitted to be elected to the party Executive, despite his impressive talents.
The anxieties, uncertainties and excuses revealed by this record in the face of the Khrushchev revelations along with Monty Johnstone's critique of Soviet behaviour and the CPGB's acquiescence in its misdeeds mirror very clearly the situation in the party expressed in the writings and recollections of numerous participants. Evidently the YCL leadership — despite John Moss's claim of less discussion there — was more divided than that of the CP even at this stage, prior to the intensification of the controversy during the summer and the Soviet military repression in Hungary in November — the switch of one vote would have carried the resolution and generated a crisis between the CP and its youth organisation; however the priority of not rocking boats proved to be the instinct of the majority, even if a bare one. Young communists as much as their seniors struggled to find their direction among political upheavals which were overthrowing the foundations of their mental universes.
