Der Thälmann Skandal [I]

In his review of Hermann Weber and Bernhard H. Bayerlein (eds), Der Thälmann Skandal, the collection of documents concerning the removal from his post of KPD chairman Ernst Thälmann due to his covering up of corruption in the Hamburg organisation and his subsequent reinstatement by Stalin, Norman LaPorte writes that one of the editors, Bayerlein, 'makes the convincing case that Stalin believed Thälmann had been "turned" by the Nazis', hence his lack of interest in negotiating his release. A quote from the Dimitrov Diaries is used, in which Stalin put this view to Dimitrov and claimed that 'his letters are witness to the influence of fascist ideology…'.

Having read the part of the Thälmann-Stalin correspondence published in the May and June 1996 issues of Utopie Kreativ, the Berlin journal close to the PDS, I find Bayerlein's arguments wholly unconvincing. The letters justify everything the KPD, CI and Soviet Union had done and were doing at the time. There is no sign of doubt in the policy followed, never mind any 'fascist ideology'.

Stalin had no interest in doing a deal with the nazis during the Pact in order to get Thälmann to Moscow. He had prevented a well-planned scheme to free him already in 1935. Thälmann's presence would have hindered his liquidation of Comintern workers and communist refugees. Furthermore, Thälmann was seen as an 'anti-fascist hero', and with Dimitrov there, and untouchable, another would be double trouble. Stalin had Ulbricht, Pieck and many other loyal stalinists to do his bidding at the head of the KPD when it became necessary. Thälmann was surplus to requirements.

LaPorte believes that the editors 'could also have stressed that almost no German communist leader ever wanted to lead the Comintern…'. In the months following the 'March Action' (1921) about the half the KPD membership, including many leading trade unionists, Reichstag deputies, and co-chairman of the party Ernst Däumig. Less than two months after the KPD's Essen Congress in March 1927, where he argued from a 'right' position, Arthur Rosenberg resigned from the party. He argued that the Comintern was unreformable, as it could not cut across the interests of the USSR. Both his speech at Essen and his resignation letter are appended to Mario Kessler's biography of Rosenberg (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2003). Why should any communist want to leave, as long as one believes one is part of the world revolutionary party, or, if it is degenerating, it is still capable of reform?

An explanation for Clara Zetkin remaining in the KPD, in spite of her hostility to the 'third period' and her general negative evaluation of the Comintern is also lacking, the reviewer points out. Tania Ünlüdag's 'Die Tragödie einer Kämpferin für die Arbeiterbewegung? Clara Zetkin 1928-1931' in IWK (Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung), No. 3, September 1997, an essay presenting Zetkin's letter to the CPSU politbureau of 8 December 1928, her speech at the ECCI presidium of 19 December 1928, plus half a dozen other letters, tackles precisely that question.

Due to till health Zetkin lived mainly in the Soviet Union. She had a heart condition, was almost blind, and suffered from other ailments. She was often in sanatoria or health resorts. From 1921 Zetkin was looked after by a nurse who was also a GPU/OGPU agents. Her post was under control too.

After visiting Germany in 1927, she wrote letters to Bukharin (11 Sept 1927) and Pyatnitzky (26 Sept 1927) describing the lamentable state of the KPD under the leadership of Thälmann, whom she saw as 'lacking theoretical education', as having 'character-weaknesses', and suffering from the 'self-delusion' that he was the 'German Lenin'. Someone showed Thälmann the letter. Henceforth Zetkin was boycotted by the KPD. For example, her Reminiscences of Lenin appeared in French in 1926, followed by an English edition, though she did not get to check the translations. A German edition appeared only in 1929, without her checking the text. She had difficulties getting articles published and items that did appear were censored.

Zetkin shared the views of the KPD (Opposition), the expelled current around Brandler-Thalheimer. She had contact with some of its members, as shown by the four letters to Fanny Jezierska, and the fact that some of her internal protests appeared in the journal Gegen der Strom. Zetkin did not come our publicly for the KPO and avoided steps that would have led to her expulsion. Anyway, the KPO aim was to reform the KPD/CI from the outside. Ünlüdag points out the economic dependency of Zetkin, her son Maxim and his wife Emilia Milevidova upon the CI (or Soviet Union) and KPD, but sets out other causes for her staying in the party.

Ünlüdag refers to Zetkin's 'authoritarian' characteristics. She notes her attitude towards key events in her political life. Zetkin was a product of Wilhelmine society and the rise and fall of the SPD. She welcomed the centralised control and discipline imposed by the Comintern on its sections. In this she was the opposite of Luxemburg, who had always opposed Lenin's party-concept and foresaw bolshevik domination of the new international. While Luxemburg was wary of Lenin, Zetkin idolised him. Luxemburg criticised key parts of bolshevik policy openly already in 1918, whereas Zetkin kept quiet. If she was troubled by developments in the Soviet Union later, she kept it to herself. In that regard, Ünlüdag suggests that her caution could owe itself to concern about how open criticism could affect her son and his wife, both members of the CPSU. Both are described as ambitious. Could they have influenced Zetkin, she asks. They corrected her manuscripts. The first draft of a speech by Zetkin upon receiving the Order of Lenin heaped praise on him but didn't mention Stalin. The final one contained the obligatory references to the 'genius-like leader of the Soviet state'.

Tania Ünlüdag subsequently wrote a biography of Zetkin but I have not read it. The reviewer is right to stress the need for a critical biography of Thälmann. A John-Prescott like figure: over-promoted, a buffoon, popular among the communist workers, a myth was built around him, particularly in the GDR (for example, his supposed role in the Hamburg uprising). In his memoirs, Karl Retzlaw relates how he showed Skoblevsky, the military adviser sent by the bolsheviks, the preparations in Hamburg. 'Thälmann was then a pub-tribune (Kneipen Volksredner). Retzlaw gave him no details of the plan as 'alcohol played too large part in his life'. [ 1 ]

Mike Jones

 

 

Notes

1. Spartakus. Augstieg und Nidergang. Erinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters, Franfurt/Main:, revised edition, 1976, p241.