In his letter to CHNN, Mike Jones takes issue with Bayerlein's interpretation of Stalin's stance towards Thälmann. Having read the correspondence between Stalin and Thälmann, he finds it implausible that Stalin thought that Thälmann had been influenced by 'fascist ideology' and, as someone 'turned' by the enemy, should be left to his fate in the nazis' prison camps. It is difficult to cover every point made by an author in a review (even longer reviews as published here). For this reason, I should take responsibility for the cursory treatment of Bayerlein's research finding. In his appraisal of recent research, which takes into account the new insights offered by the Dimitrov Diaries and encoded ECCI telegrams, Bayerlein offers greater analytical precision that was apparent in the review. As this is not available to English-language readers, it is worth giving the topic some further coverage.

Bayerlein addresses the vexed question of why Stalin did not lift a finger to have Thälmann released from Hitler's dungeons. It had, after all, proved possible in other cases (for example, with the Hungarian Rakosi and the Romanian Anna Pauker and prisoner 'swaps' had taken place after the Nazi-Soviet Pact). The files cannot serve as a window into Stalin's soul. We will never know precisely what motivated Stalin's decision abandon Thälmann to his 'sad fate' (Bayerlein) in nazi Germany. But clues in this psychological puzzle are offer by Stalin's statements to leading communists. On 19 March 1940, Molotov showed Stalin a letter from Thälmann dated 3 March, which pleaded for the 'active engagement of his Russian friends' for his release. Stalin merely wrote on it 'into the archive'. Bayerlein concurs with the conclusion of the Russian historian D S Davydovic that this was little short of a 'death sentence'. Immediately prior to the nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin's response to the reinvigorated Comintern campaign for Thälmann's release was little short of malicious. The Soviet dictator was concerned that it would impact adversely on Moscow's policy of friendly relations with 'Hitler-Germany'. Bayerlein emphasises the casualness with which Stalin made these statement, which had a life-or-death significance for Thälmann, using them to illustrate the indifference of the Soviet dictator.

In the absence of any 'smoking gun' evidence that actually claims to tell us what motivated Stalin to act towards Thälmann in this manner, interpretation is everything - and CHNN welcomes debate on this, and any other, matter raised here.

The two other issues Mike Jones' letter raises are also of importance. Firstly, he agrees the absence of a critical, post-Cold War biography of Thälmann is a serious omission in the literature. After gaining funding generously provided by the Barry Amiel and Norman Melburn Trust, I have begun to research the political life of Ernst Thälmann in a project the will culminate in the publication of a biography. Secondly, he draws our attention to the complexity of what could be termed the psychology of communist leaders. Little has been written on either the motivation of those, like Clara Zetkin, who stayed in the Comintern and its national sections despite their growing reservations about its direction; or those, like Arthur Rosenberg, who chose to leave and fight for socialist outside the Comintern. It is a subject that I will return to in the next issue of CHNN.

Norman La Porte